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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-2634 
_____________ 
 
ROSEMERY VANESSA ANTUNEZ; A. V. A., 
       Petitioners 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
       Respondent  
______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency Nos. A208-158-069, A208-158-070) 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
April 16, 2018 
______________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., RENDELL and FUENTES, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  June 1, 2018) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION*  
______________ 
 
 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 Rosemery Vanessa Antunez seeks review, on behalf of herself and her minor child 
A.V.A., of a final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).  The BIA affirmed 
the decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Antunez’s request for asylum, 
withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) protection.1  For the 
reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for review. 
I. Factual and Procedural Background2 
 Antunez and her minor child are natives and citizens of Honduras who entered the 
United States without being admitted or paroled.  They were found to be removable 
under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1101-1537 (2012).  On January 7, 2016, Antunez filed applications for asylum, 
withholding of removal, and CAT protection.   
 In support of her applications, Antunez offered testimonial evidence and submitted 
documentary evidence.  She testified that a relative’s husband with whom she lived twice 
touched her legs and chest when she was eleven or twelve years old.  Several years later, 
she was hit, insulted, and ultimately abandoned by the father of A.V.A., with whom she 
                                                 
1   A.V.A., the minor child, was a derivative beneficiary on Antunez’s asylum 
application. 
 
2   “We take our facts from the final order of the BIA, and to the extent the BIA relied 
upon it, the Immigration Judge’s decision.”  Sesay v. Att’y Gen., 787 F.3d 215, 218 n.1 
(3d Cir. 2015). 
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was pregnant at the time.  The man left Honduras for the Cayman Islands.  A.V.A. was 
born in 2005. 
Antunez eventually had trouble finding work to support herself and began selling 
second-hand clothing.  Around this time, she was robbed on two occasions by different 
individuals, who stole her cell phone and money.  In November 2014, gang members also 
began extorting her, ordering that she pay them money, or “rent,” at the end of every 
month.  App. 14.  Specifically, two Mara 18 members appeared at her home, brandished a 
gun, and told her that she needed to have the money ready for them when they returned.  
Antunez paid them 1500 lempiras for three months.  The gang members demanded 3000 
lempiras in February 2015, telling her that they would kill her and A.V.A. if she did not 
pay rent and would harm them if she informed police.  Antunez left Honduras with her 
minor child in March 2015, expressing concern for her safety and that of A.V.A and a 
belief that she was targeted because she was a single mother without a male protector.  
She at no time made complaints to the Honduran police.   
The IJ found Antunez’s testimony to be credible and entitled it to full evidentiary 
weight.  Nonetheless, the IJ found that her experiences did not amount to persecution.  He 
noted the sexual assault, domestic violence, robberies, and extortion to which Antunez 
testified.  But the IJ also recognized that Antunez:  (1) avoided the relative’s husband 
who assaulted her and moved away from that house; and (2) was not physically harmed 
by the Mara 18, even though she knew of others who were harmed and killed for failing 
to pay money.  While expressing sympathy about what Antunez endured, the IJ 
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concluded that “the threat of harm she has experienced and the mental anguish associated 
with having a child threatened . . . does not rise to the level of ‘persecution.’”  App. 18-
19.  The IJ additionally rejected the argument that she suffered from economic 
persecution and, even if she did, determined it was not on account of a protected ground. 
 Next, the IJ stated that while he was satisfied that Antunez had a subjective fear of 
harm, he could not find that any harm she would suffer in the future would be on the 
basis of her membership in a protected group.  The IJ explained Antunez did not 
demonstrate that “single Honduran women without male protection” meets the 
particularity or social distinction requirements to be a cognizable social group under the 
INA.  App. 19.  Moreover, even if the IJ were to find that it was cognizable, she “has not 
established that her membership in the purported social group would be at least one 
central reason why a criminal gang member in Honduras would threaten or harm her.”  
App. 20.  Rather, the record establishes that she was a target of the Mara 18 because the 
gang sought economic gain, noting Antunez’s testimony that members targeted both men 
and women of any age so long as they would pay them the money demanded.   
The IJ likewise rejected Antunez’s contention that she had a well-founded fear of 
harm by criminal organizations on account of an imputed political opinion, that is, “her 
opposition to the de facto government of Honduras comprised of criminal organizations 
and gangs.”  App. 20-21.  He instead concluded that the gang members and other 
criminals were “acting out of a desire for economic gain,” not on account of Antunez’s 
political opinion, imputed or otherwise.  App. 21.  Because Antunez could not 
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demonstrate either past persecution or future persecution on account of a protected 
ground, the IJ denied her application for asylum as well as for withholding of removal. 
 Finally, the IJ also concluded that Antunez had “not shown that [it] is more likely 
than not . . . that she will be tortured in the future in Honduras, let alone with the consent 
or acquiescence of the government.” App. 22.  He did, however, acknowledge “the 
seriousness of violence in Honduras, Respondent’s past harm, [and] the presence of 
corruption in law enforcement.”  Id. 
 Antunez appealed the decision, and a one-judge panel of the BIA affirmed.  First, 
the BIA agreed that the instances of domestic violence did not constitute persecution, and 
Antunez failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution by her relative’s husband 
or her former partner.  Moreover, the BIA found no clear error in the IJ’s factual finding 
that Antunez’s criminal persecutors were motivated by economic gain as opposed to her 
membership in a particular social group or her political opinion.  In addition, the BIA 
stated that, “[w]hile the respondent has shown that there is a possibility she may be 
tortured if returned to Honduras, the [IJ’s] determination that she has not shown a 
likelihood of torture with the acquiescence (including willful blindness) of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity is not clearly erroneous.”  App. 10.  
It therefore dismissed Antunez’s appeal.  This timely petition followed. 
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II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The BIA had appellate jurisdiction to review the IJ’s removal order under 8 C.F.R. 
§§ 1003.1(b)(3) and 1240.15.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.   
Where, as here, “the BIA issued its own opinion, we review its decision rather 
than that of the IJ.”  Patel v. Att’y Gen., 599 F.3d 295, 297 (3d Cir. 2010).  “However, we 
also look to the decision of the IJ to the extent that the BIA defers to, or adopts, the IJ’s 
reasoning.”  Id.  “We affirm any findings of fact supported by substantial evidence and 
are ‘bound by the administrative findings of fact unless a reasonable adjudicator would 
be compelled to arrive at a contrary conclusion.’”  Camara v. Att’y Gen., 580 F.3d 196, 
201 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Yan Lan Wu v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 418, 421 (3d Cir. 2005)).  
We review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo.3  Wang v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 347, 349 
(3d Cir. 2004).   
III. Analysis 
With respect to her asylum and withholding of removal applications, Antunez 
argues that the BIA erred in concluding that she had not established past persecution or a 
well-founded fear of future persecution on account of her status as a single woman 
                                                 
3   Normally, we review the BIA’s legal conclusions subject to the principles of Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  Mahn v. 
Att’y Gen., 767 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2014).  Chevron deference, though, is 
inappropriate here where “we are asked to review an unpublished, non-precedential 
decision issued by a single BIA member.”  Id. 
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without male protection.  Antunez also contends that the BIA applied incorrect standards 
of review in considering the IJ’s denial of her CAT claim. 
A. Asylum and Withholding of Removal 
To qualify for asylum, an applicant must demonstrate that she is “unable or 
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the 
protection of, that country because of [past] persecution or a well-founded fear of [future] 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion.”4  Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 496, 503 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)).  To establish eligibility for withholding of removal, 
an applicant must demonstrate “a clear probability of persecution.”  Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 
1233, 1238 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 430 (1984)).   
First, the record does not compel us to disagree with the BIA’s factual finding that 
Antunez did not establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution at the 
hands of her relative’s husband and intimate partner.  Although the harassment she 
suffered was offensive and improper, it does not “constitute a threat to life or freedom.”  
Id. at 1240; see also Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 615 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[I]solated 
                                                 
4   The term “persecution” includes “threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic 
restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life or freedom,” but “does not 
encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or 
unconstitutional.”  Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240.  The persecution “must be committed by the 
government or forces the government is either unable or unwilling to control.”  
Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 637 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 
F.3d 530, 537 (3d Cir. 2005)).   
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incidents that do not result in serious injury do not rise to the level of persecution.”); 
Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1243 (“‘[P]ersecution’ is an extreme concept that does not include every 
sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.”).  There is also substantial evidence to 
support the conclusion that Antunez lacks a well-founded fear of persecution at the hands 
of these individuals where she and A.V.A. would not have to live or interact with either 
her cousin’s husband or intimate partner upon return to Honduras. 
Antunez’s argument that the “IJ and BIA erred in discounting Petitioner’s history 
of sexual assault and domestic violence” by considering the incidents in a vacuum is 
unpersuasive.  Pet’r’s Br. 25.  Both the IJ and BIA recounted the full history of 
harassment and recognized its “deplorable” nature, especially given her age at the time.  
App. 9.  Their sound conclusion that the conduct nonetheless did not rise to persecution 
cannot be attributed to a failure to properly consider the evidence, and we will not accept 
her seeming invitation to reweigh the evidence in the record. 
Second, substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s determination that any 
persecution (economic or otherwise) by gang members was not motivated by Atunez’s 
status as a single mother.  Assuming arguendo, as did the BIA, that single Honduran 
women without male protection constitute a cognizable particular social group, the record 
reflects that Mara 18 members targeted both men and women for economic gain.  We 
cannot conclude that a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled, under these facts, to 
find a nexus between Antunez’s feared harm and her membership in the asserted 
particular social group.  See Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 494 (3d Cir. 2001) 
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(explaining that acts of private violence put forth by the petitioner “could represent 
random street violence, motivated not by animosity against a particular ethnic group, but 
rather by arbitrary hostility or by a desire to reap financial rewards”).   
None of Antunez’s claims on this point has merit.  Her arguments about economic 
and other persecution at the hands of gang members and whether she established 
membership in a particular social group are irrelevant to our conclusion where the BIA 
affirmed the IJ’s decision on the basis that any such persecution nonetheless lacked the 
necessary nexus to the purported protected ground for asylum status.5  In addition, the 
persecutor’s supposed knowledge of her status as a single mother without male protection 
does not compel the conclusion that they were motivated by such information.  A 
determination that Antunez’s testimony before the IJ was credible, moreover, does not 
require the adjudicator to adopt as a factual matter her belief that she was targeted on 
account of her status in a purported social group.  See Morgan v. Holder, 634 F.3d 53, 
59-60 (1st Cir. 2011) (“An IJ may reject ‘speculation as to motive even while generally 
finding petitioner credible as to historical facts.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Ziu v. 
Gonzales, 412 F.3d 202, 204 (1st Cir. 2005))); cf. Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 252 
(3d Cir. 2009) (“[C]redible testimony alone is not always sufficient to meet the burden of 
                                                 
5   The BIA did not need to employ de novo review on the issue of whether this requisite 
nexus exists.  See Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 384 (3d Cir. 2010) (describing 
“whether [an alien] will be individually targeted based on a protected characteristic” as a 
“factual part of the inquiry” concerning a well-founded fear of persecution). 
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proof.”).  And documentary evidence in the record about the “wide consensus that 
violence against women is a fundamental problem in Honduras,” Pet’r’s Br. 31, does not 
require a different result.6  Cf. Abdille, 242 F.3d at 495 (“Aside from . . . documentary 
evidence [about a generalized climate of hostility against the protected group], [the 
petitioner] furnished no evidence demonstrating that the . . . attacks he experienced . . . 
were not mere acts of random lawlessness . . . .”).  We discern no reason to disturb the 
BIA’s ruling as to Antunez’s asylum and withholding of removal applications. 
B. CAT Claim 
An applicant for CAT protection “bears the burden of establishing that it is more 
likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of 
removal.”7  Kamara v. Att’y Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 212-13 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174-75 (3d Cir. 
2002)).  As we recently explained in Myrie v. Attorney General United States, 855 F.3d 
509 (3d Cir. 2017): 
                                                 
6   Antunez argues that the decisions of the IJ and BIA do not indicate that crucial parts of 
her testimony and corroborating evidence were considered.  But the BIA need not 
“discuss every piece of evidence mentioned by an asylum applicant,” so long as it does 
not “ignore evidence favorable to the alien.”  Huang, 620 F.3d at 388.  We are not 
persuaded that the BIA erred by ignoring or misconstruing evidence here.  
 
7   For an act to amount to torture for the purposes of CAT relief, it must be:  “(1) an act 
causing severe physical or mental pain or suffering; (2) intentionally inflicted; (3) for an 
illicit or proscribed purpose; (4) by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official who has custody or physical control of the victim; and 
(5) not arising from lawful sanctions.”  Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 151 (3d Cir. 
2005). 
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To determine whether an applicant has met the burden of 
establishing that it is more likely than not he would be tortured if removed, 
the IJ must address two questions: “(1) what is likely to happen to the 
petitioner if removed; and (2) does what is likely to happen amount to the 
legal definition of torture?”  In the first part of the inquiry, the IJ reviews 
the evidence and determines future events more likely than not to occur. . . . 
Accordingly, the Board reviews these factual findings for clear error.  The 
IJ then determines whether the likely harm qualifies as torture under the 
governing regulations, and the Board reviews this legal conclusion de 
novo.  
In assessing whether an applicant has established that public officials 
will acquiesce to the feared tortuous acts of a non-state actor, the IJ also 
must conduct a two-part analysis.  First, the IJ makes a factual finding or 
findings as to how public officials will likely act in response to the harm the 
petitioner fears.  Next, the IJ assesses whether the likely response from 
public officials qualifies as acquiescence under the governing regulations. . 
. . While the Board reviews the first part for clear error, it must review the 
second de novo. 
 
Id. at 516-17 (citations omitted) (quoting Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 271 (3d 
Cir. 2010)). 
With respect to the CAT claim, the IJ did not identify what future events are more 
likely than not to occur upon Antunez’s removal to Honduras or how public officials will 
likely respond to feared tortuous acts, although he did recognize “the seriousness of 
violence in Honduras, Respondent’s past harm, [and] the presence of corruption in law 
enforcement.”  App. 22.  He nevertheless concluded that “there is insufficient evidence 
demonstrating that it is more likely than not that the respondent would be tortured by the 
government of Honduras or by a private individual or group with its acquiescence or 
willful blindness.”  Id.   
In reviewing the IJ’s determination, the BIA held that the IJ’s “predictive findings 
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with respect to the respondent’s likelihood of torture are not clearly erroneous.”  App. 10.  
It noted the facts that the “harms and threats to [Antunez] were . . . by private actors,” as 
opposed to public officials or persons acting in an official capacity, and that Antunez had 
testified that “she did not report threats or harm to the police due to her perception that 
doing so would have been futile.”  App. 10.  The BIA dismissed the appeal after 
concluding that, “[w]hile the respondent has shown that there is a possibility she may be 
tortured if returned to Honduras, the [IJ’s] determination that she has not shown a 
likelihood of torture with the acquiescence (including willful blindness) of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity is not clearly erroneous.”  Id. 
 We agree with Antunez that the BIA’s opinion here indicates that it applied the 
incorrect standard of review to the IJ’s decision.  The BIA appears to have melded the 
relevant factual and legal inquiry in evaluating the CAT claim.  It refers to the IJ’s 
“predictive findings with respect to the respondent’s likelihood of torture,” even though 
the IJ made no purely factual predictive determinations in his decision.8  Id.  Instead, both 
the IJ and BIA essentially proceeded to the second question, that is, whether unspecified 
harm would amount to the legal definition of torture and whether the unspecified likely 
response from public officials qualifies as acquiescence.   
                                                 
8   The Government argues that the IJ “resolved Antunez’s CAT protection claim solely 
on his predictive findings about the likelihood of torture and governmental 
[acquiescence] in torture,” Resp’t’s Br. 40, but the determinations in the IJ opinion are 
not purely factual in nature.  See Myrie, 855 F.3d at 517. 
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Such an approach is not necessarily problematic.  Indeed, we have previously 
explained that predictive factual findings are not necessary where the IJ and BIA 
conclude that an applicant fails to satisfy the second prong of the Kaplun v. Attorney 
General, 602 F.3d 260, 271 (3d. Cir. 2010), test summarized in Myrie.  See Green v. Att’y 
Gen., 694 F.3d 503, 508 (3d Cir. 2012) (finding no error where the IJ and BIA 
“assum[ed] a likelihood of harm under the first Kaplun prong and then determin[ed] that 
this harm would not meet the legal definition of torture under the second Kaplun prong”).  
The issue here is that the BIA expressly applied clear error review to a legal 
determination by the IJ that whatever might befall Antunez does not meet the legal 
definition of torture; the BIA should have revisited this conclusion de novo.  See Myrie, 
855 F.3d at 517. 
Nonetheless, we will not remand to the BIA because the error is harmless.  See Li 
Hua Yuan v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[W]e will view an error as 
harmless and not necessitating a remand to the BIA when it is highly probable that the 
error did not affect the outcome of the case.”); see also NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 
U.S. 759, 766 n.6 (1969) (“[SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943),] does not require 
that we convert judicial review of agency action into a ping-pong game.”).  The IJ 
noted—and the BIA referred to—the presence of violence and law enforcement 
corruption in Honduras as discussed by the documentary evidence.  But the background 
materials also highlight that the Honduran government has recently launched a special 
investigative unit for murders of women, initiated significant anti-corruption efforts 
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concerning the police force, and made substantial investments in the police and public 
ministry to help address crimes perpetrated by gangs.  The record also includes two 
examples of individuals captured by the National Anti-Extortion Force for charging 
“rent” after it received complaints from the community.  Meanwhile, the BIA noted that 
Antunez had not reported any conduct by the private actors to the police.  Given the 
evidence presented, we are confident that “there is no realistic possibility that, absent the 
error[], the . . . BIA would have” concluded that the Honduran government’s likely 
response to any harm suffered by Antunez would amount to acquiescence.9  Cao He Lin 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 428 F.3d 391, 401 (2d Cir. 2005). 
IV. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
                                                 
9   Antunez argues that the record compels the conclusion that the Honduran government 
is unable or unwilling to protect women from violence.  The “unwilling or unable to” 
standard, however, “is not applicable to a claim for relief under the CAT.”  Valdiviezo-
Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 611 (3d Cir. 2011). 
